This article is the fourth in a series of articles on criminal intent, analyzing B against the Attorney General ["DPP"], [2000] 1 All ER 833, [2000] Crim. L. Rev. 403 [HL] [UK]. The second case shows a paradigm shift in the UK criminal common law, and B v. DPP, which allows the English common law to move further towards unity and consistency.
In the case of B v. DPP, the 15-year-old defender repeatedly asked a 13-year-old girl to have oral sex. The girl refused.
According to the "Children's Law" of Elizabeth, 8 and 9 years old, in 1960, the royal family accused B. 2, § 1 [1] [English]. It provides,
"Any person who commits a serious defamation of a child under the age of 14 or incites a child under that age to do so with that person or person is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a maximum of two years. Or on summary conviction, sentenced to imprisonment for not more than six months, fine not exceeding one hundred kilograms, or both.
The parliament amended the regulations and sentenced to 10 years in prison.
The relevant defense is a "factual error" that differs between general crimes and specific intentional crimes. The general intention of the crime requires that the "factual error" evidence is honest [subjective] and reasonable [objective].
However, the specific intention of the crime requires false evidence to be honest [subjective]. Therefore, specific intentional crimes allow for any minor errors to mitigate the obligations contained in the smaller compensation.
Previously, the English courts explained the statistical silence on the specific intent to prove the general intent. But here, Lord Nichols explained the silence to rule out strict liability. In fact, Lord Nicholls explained the silence about the criminal intent in order to find a specific intentional crime, not a general intent.
In order to rule out the general intent, Lord Nichols analyzed the mistakes of the factual defense and rejected the honest and reasonable request. Correspondingly, the law requires that the error of factual evidence is honest.
Lord Nicholls ruled out an objective factor and reasoned the objective criteria for negligent criminal imports [ie what the defendant should know, not what he actually believed]. Parliament can make a crime of negligence, Lord Nichols admits that this requires honest and reasonable factual evidence. However, Lord Nichols believes that this statement does not clearly define the elements of negligent crime. Similarly, in this case, the law requires that the error of factual evidence is honest.
He stated that "...the common law principle has nothing to do with the principle of universal application, because spiritual factors are essential elements of criminal offences..."
Lord Nicholls concluded that the statue needed a crown to prove each material element with the necessary mens rea. Through analogical reasoning, the common law defines criminals of rapists as reckless discrimination or intent to act without consent.
In analyzing the serious crimes based on exposure, Lord Nicholls determined that Crown's evidence of a specific intentional crime must be more professional than the general intention of "moral condemnation."
This sentence was originally sentenced to two years in prison. Protecting young people in accordance with strong public policies, the Parliament defines a child's commitment as a strict liability offence, omitting criminal intent.
In order to maintain proportionality, these crimes need to be shortened. However, the parliament increased the contact time to ten years. The increased penalty claims that the strict liability is disproportionate.
Lord Nicholls interprets the age factor as the ensuing environment. Unlike strict liability crimes, evidence of crimes is omitted, where Lord Nichols believes that the evidence of the Crown must not only prove the ensuing situation, but must also prove the criminal intent associated with the ensuing situation. .
Lord Nicholls said that if "the observer of the parliament believes that the position should be directed at this serious social problem, then the parliament must face difficulties and clearly express its wishes."
B v. DPP demonstrates the advancement of common law in the direction of MPC. The MPC reflects the basic method of defining a specific intentional crime. However, MPC provides a unified definition of the elements of psychological responsibility. Therefore, MPC jurisdictions can apply analogical reasoning to rebel against crime and management law. B v. The DPP and Morgan represent the common law moving in the same direction.
Orignal From: Learning Criminal Law - BV DPP as a further development of Regina V Morgan
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